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A related move appears later, in section 
(5.1) when he considers an austere vision 
of cognition that does without reference 
to goals and rewards, in favor of compre-
hensive analysis in terms of expectations. 
Clark correctly holds back from endorsing 
this possibility, but for relatively generic rea-
sons to the effect that even if some descrip-
tion is in principle replaceable, it may be 
convenient to continue using it. This misses 
the main chance. Recent work on the neu-
ral implementation of decision in various 
vertebrates including humans has produced 
a body of results highly congenial to the uni-
fying vision Clark supports.
Consider saccadic movements in rhesus 
monkeys. A key component in the neural 
implementation of these movements is the 
lateral intraparietal area (LIP), which com-
prises a topographic map integrating loca-
tions in the visual field and aspects of the 
muscular plans that would effect the cen-
tering of gaze on those locations. It, along 
with a network of other maps with varying 
topographies in the frontal eye fields, supe-
rior colliculus and related areas, provides a 
striking illustration of what Clark calls an 
“action-centric” representation. In addi-
tion, as studies including Platt and Glimcher 
(1999) and Dorris and Glimcher (2004) have 
shown, some activity in LIP neurons of rhe-
sus monkeys on visually identical trials varies 
in precise ways with the relative expected 
rewards (or relative subjective value) from 
saccades to the represented location. These 
representations are not merely “action-cen-
tric” insofar as they combine answers to the 
questions “where is it?” with “how do I gaze 
at it?” They also include identifiable activ-
ity corresponding to the answer to “what’s it 
probably worth for me to look at it?”
There’s more. The expected relative 
reward values attached to saccadic and 
other movements are not sui generis. They 
are predictions, and ones that get updated 
in the light of ongoing experience. Among 
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Clark’s synthesis of much recent work on 
sensory and motor systems in the brain is 
at once radical and curiously traditional. 
It is radical, among other things, concern-
ing what representations are, how they are 
constructed, and what sensory and motor 
representations have in common. But it is 
traditionally cognitivist in viewing the main 
task of brains as being that of representing 
the world.
What this traditional orientation 
tends to neglect is the role of the brain 
as a system for selecting among avail-
able actions. This phenomenon has an 
ultimate aspect regarding the external 
standards relevant to assessing actions. 
Various behavioral ecological schemes for 
ranking actions in terms of their contri-
bution to quantities such as fitness, and 
economic models of revealed preference, 
are the leading theoretical players here. 
The phenomenon also has a proximal 
aspect, which concerns the specific bio-
logical mechanisms, including neural 
ones, by means of which the values of 
different available actions might be rep-
resented, and selections between them 
made. On this topic the recent explosion 
of neuroeconomic research on decision 
processes in the brain is urgently relevant.
Natural agents have limited means of 
action, and those means have alternative – 
sometimes mutually exclusive – uses. That 
is to say the predicament of natural agents is 
fundamentally an economic one, even if it 
is not necessary that selection converge on 
a system for responding to the predicament 
in which economic variables are explicitly 
represented. Furthermore there is consider-
able evidence from behavioral ecology and 
other fields that many vertebrate behav-
iors in natural settings are economically 
efficient.
Neither the ultimate nor the proximal 
aspects of the problem of selecting between 
behaviors play a significant role in Clark’s 
account. Natural selection, fitness, and bio-
logical descendents are not mentioned at 
all, and cognate concepts like adaptiveness 
feature in diluted form. There’s similarly lit-
tle mention of decision and choice as theo-
retically understood in economics including 
neuroeconomics, none of incentives, and 
reward and utility appear only in the course 
of musing over whether it is possible that 
cognitive neuroscience could do without 
reference to either (section 5.1). Clark does 
make some important points about action-
centric representations, but even here does 
not consider the problem of action selection.
Of course, no survey can cover anything 
that anyone thinks is relevant, and it’s very 
easy to complain about things that are 
left out. Clark’s lack of engagement with 
neuroeconomics means missing a specific 
opportunity to make his general case even 
more compelling, because what is emerg-
ing in that field complements his case about 
sensory and motor systems in deep ways.
In his section (3.2) Clark apparently takes 
seriously the concern that an agent with the 
sort of brain that he’s been describing would 
be expected to “seek a nice dark room and 
stay in it”. Clark disposes of the worry by 
pointing out that creatures with real biologi-
cal needs should “expect” to follow explora-
tory strategies, and that these expectations 
themselves should recruit both perception 
and action. This is part of a reasonable and 
interesting response, but action selection 
under those conditions (as with most oth-
ers) would still require some way of dealing 
with specific questions, such as where and 
how to forage, and how to trade off forag-
ing with other expected behaviors such as 
predator avoidance and reproduction.
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the key findings on this topic is that dopa-
mine neurons do not – as previously sup-
posed – directly encode hedonic value 
(because if they did they would respond 
in the same to expected and unexpected 
rewards of equivalent hedonic worth). 
Rather it turns out that they encode some 
aspects of the difference between experi-
enced and expected reward (Montague 
et al., 1997, see also Bayer and Glimcher, 
2005). While many details about the opera-
tion of this system, and its interaction with 
other neural systems, have yet to be deter-
mined, it is nonetheless clear that crucial 
features of the neural systems for attaching 
values to sensory events and actions operate 
by means of prediction error. In this respect 
they suggest a way of expanding the scope 
of Clark’s claim about the importance of 
minimizing prediction error as a general 
goal of neural systems.
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